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1

Introduction

Embedded in most debates about the environmental question is the view that changes in consumers’
behavior are a necessary condition for a transition to a cleaner society to happen. By inciting consumers
to shift from polluting to less-polluting products, a more deeply rooted environmental consciousness
would spark a major drop in the mass of pollutants through modi…ed individual consumption choices.
We refer to the various doctrines that compete on the market for ideas to shape the consumer side
as environmentalism (also called “green consumerism”). This paper’s core goal is then to study how
environmentalism a¤ects the way …rms choose their products and the ensuing consequences for the
global level of pollution. Since the empirical literature on the consequences of green consumerism is
meager, we …nd it meaningful to start with a theory-based investigation.
We show that environmentalism is not the silver bullet that will solve the environmental question
because it bolsters a lower consumption of environmentally friendly products, which echoes the Jevons
paradox (Alcott, 2005). The reason for that lies in …rms’response: they use their higher market power
to raise their prices, which in turn leads consumers to buy more brown products at the expense of green
ones. This result is in line with the empirical evidence gathered around the so-called rebound e¤ect.
This e¤ect is observed whenever the expected gains generated by using more environmentally friendly
products are reduced due to changes in consumption behavior as a whole. For example, hybrid vehicles
with reduced per-unit emissions are marketed worldwide with the consequence of making cheaper the
ordinary vehicles whose usage is thus increased. Using Australian data, Murray (2013) …nds that
rebound e¤ects may o¤set the expected bene…ts of environmentalism.
The key-issue is that consumers endowed with greener preferences have a higher willingness-to-pay
for clean products. Firms will, therefore, respond to that by changing prices and qualities. The following
question then suggests itself: do these new qualities have the expected consequences for environmental
sustainability? The conventional approach is to consider a market where …rms produce a vertically
di¤erentiated good whose environmental qualities are chosen by their producers; this good is sold to
consumers who have a higher willingness-to-pay for the green variants than for the brown ones. However,
this modeling strategy fails to capture the various factors that a¤ect consumers’ choices in a context
where cultural, political and social values interact with standard preferences (see below for references).
That said, as Stigler and Becker (1977) warned us, care is needed when considering deviations from
standard preferences, for otherwise one runs the risk of providing “microeconomic foundations” to
almost any prediction or recommendation policy. This is why we consider a minimal deviation from
a well-established model where qualities are di¤erentiated by their footprints by adding idiosyncratic
psychic costs and bene…ts to the preferences of rational consumers.
As argued by Glaeser (2014), in the presence of environmentalism, a consumer who buys green
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enjoys a psychic bene…t, which has the nature of a nonpecuniary feeling of being a “good citizen”. By
contrast, when the consumer buys brown, she bears a psychic cost, which corresponds to a nonpecuniary
feeling of shame or guiltiness (Kahn, 2007; Carlsson et al., 2010; Allcott, 2011; Pinto et al., 2014). In
this case, each product is characterized by two characteristics, namely an intrinsic attribute, which is
given by the environmental and hedonic characteristics of the product, and an extrinsic one, which is
related to the supply of environmentalism within the public sphere, the value of which is determined
by the interactions among activists, lobbies, political parties, and the media. Central to our setting
is the idea that the intrinsic attribute is chosen by …rms whereas the extrinsic attribute is given to
the …rms. Equally important, we assume that di¤erent individuals subscribe more or less to a value
system, here environmentalism. Therefore, the psychic bene…t associated with the consumption of the
green product –the consumer is a member of the reference group– whereas the psychic cost she bears
for consuming brown –she does not belong to the reference group– vary across consumers. Using this
setting, we then ask how the market responds to environmental ideology when consumers are endowed
with such preferences.
Our main …ndings may be summarized as follows. Consider a market where two …rms produce a
good whose environmental qualities are chosen by their producers. One variant is green and the other is
brown, meaning that the former has a higher environmental quality than the latter. Given the qualities
chosen by …rms, we …rst study the ensuing price-subgame. Consider two price-setting …rms that sell
the green and brown variants of a given product. When environmentalism is weak, price competition
is tough enough for the entry of the brown …rm to be deterred by the green …rm. As environmentalism
grows beyond some threshold, the green …rm enjoys enough market power to set a price su¢ ciently
high for the brown …rm to produce and sell its product. This entry raises the level of pollution because
some consumers buy brown. Once both …rms are active, a higher environmental ideology relaxes price
competition even further so that both …rms end up charging higher prices. However, more consumers
buy brown because the green …rm charges a relatively higher price than its rival.
In the quality stage, …rms anticipate accurately what the equilibrium prices will be while consumer
choices are now driven by both …rms’ quality and price decisions. The marginal production cost increases with quality because producing a higher quality good often requires more expensive inputs and
better management practices. Furthermore, improving the environmental quality also implies additional
overhead expenditures such as R&D and capital goods. We …rst show the existence and uniqueness (up
to a permutation of …rms’names) of a quality equilibrium. The market equilibrium involves two …rms
that share the market (interior equilibrium) or a single supplier (corner equilibrium).
When the supply of environmentalism is low, only one …rm invests in environmental quality while
the other …rm acts as a potential entrant. In this case, the active …rm …nds it pro…t-maximizing to
set the limit price that prevents the entry of its competitor. As the supply of environmentalism rises
3
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above some threshold, consumers become heterogeneous enough for the incumbent to rise its price,
thereby allowing the second …rm to enter the market by supplying a quality inferior to that provided by
the incumbent. In other words, the market now involves a green product and a brown product which
are, respectively, the expensive and cheap variants. Rising consumers’psychic bene…ts and costs allow
the green …rm to alleviate its investment costs by supplying a lower quality variant, whereas the higher
psychic costs incentivize the brown …rm to improve its own quality. The environmental surplus decreases
with environmentalism, whereas the social welfare increases. Consequently, environmentalism does not
act as a pro-environmental force, the reason being that both the green and brown …rms use their higher
market power to choose prices and qualities that raise their pro…ts, but not the environmental surplus.
Our results cast serious doubt on the ability of environmentalism to be the weapon that would drastically improve upon the prevailing level of pollution. They suggest instead that the responsibility to
solve the environmental question should fall on governments and producers. What is more, when combined with speci…c policy instruments, environmentalism could deliver its expected positive e¤ects. It
is, therefore, crucial to identify the instruments whose e¤ects are magni…ed by green consumerism. This
conclusion agrees with the idea that “a consistent instrument approach incorporating technology, …scal
and behavioural aspects”(European Commission DG Environment, p.16, 2011) should be evaluated to
curb emissions.
Although environmental taxes comply with the polluters pay principle, the risk of enforcing a regressive policy has led policy-makers to implement a wider portfolio of di¤erent measures to abate emissions
and promote the growth of an eco-friendly economy. In the US, the Environmental Protection Agency
de…nes standards to abate greenhouse gases generated by cars, light trucks, and heavy-duty trucks,
whereas the Renewable Fuel Standard program is used to enlarge renewable fuels sector at the expense
of imported oil. Since 2009, the EU legislation has introduced mandatory emission targets for new cars
and, later, for vans. Along the same lines, the Fuel Quality Directive has set quality requirements for
fuels used for road transport within the EU. Furthermore, both in the US and the EU a wide range of
projects enhancing eco-innovations are made available to …rms. The US Department of Energy provides
many funding opportunities in the form of grants and loans to …rms that are willing to adopt eco-friendly
technologies, whereas a great number of investment plans are currently implemented by the European
Green Deal whose aim is to reach climate neutrality by 2050.
In accordance with the above evidence, we use our baseline model to study the e¤ects of the following instruments in the presence of environmentalism: (i) the development of green technologies and
(ii) a minimum quality standard. We …rst study the impact of green technologies that allow producing
more environmental-friendly products. As expected, the use of greener technologies leads to a higher
environmental surplus through better qualities and a bigger market share for the eco-friendly variant.
These …ndings point to the social desirability of policies that facilitate the emergence of green techno4
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logical innovations. Greener technologies are the output of R&D activities undertaken by …rms and/or
external bodies such as research labs and universities. Ideally, we should combine production and R&D
within a uni…ed framework to study the full cost of green innovations (Lambertini, 2017). However,
doing this would take us too far from the main purpose of this paper. Another fairly natural instrument
is the minimum quality standard. For this policy to have an impact, the standard must be the brown
quality. We then show that the environmental surplus rises with the quality standard. In other words,
environmentalism and minimum quality standard act like complements that lead to a more ecological
consumption pattern.
Since we work with a duopoly, one may wonder what our main …ndings become in an oligopolistic
market. We show that they hold true when the market involves an arbitrary number of …rms supplying
di¤erent environmental qualities: a higher supply of environmentalism relaxes competition, which in
turn allows for the entry of …rms in the low end of the environmental quality range. Our choice to work
with a duopoly is motivated by the desire not to distract our analysis from considerations foreign to our
main purpose and to keep the analysis as simple as possible from the analytical viewpoint.
Related literature. When some consumers are willing to pay more than others to consume lesspolluting goods, the analysis of environmental quality is amenable to settings with vertically di¤erentiated products, such as those developed in industrial economics (Tirole, 1988; Belle‡amme and Peitz,
2015). These models have been applied successfully to environmental quality competition. The entry
point of this literature is that environmentally aware consumers perceive products as being vertically
di¤erentiated on the basis of their environmental impact. The main message is clear: when consumers
care about the ecological footprint of their own consumption, …rms segment the market by supplying
green and brown variants of the same good, which are sold at high and low prices. This idea has
been developed along several dimensions: (i) the emission of pollutants (Moraga Gonzales and PadronFumero, 2002), (ii) …rms’ abatement e¤ort (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Rodriguez-Ibeas et al.,
2003; Bansal, 2008; Karakosta, 2018), and (iii) the degree of corporate social responsibility adopted by
…rms (Garcia-Gallego and Georgantis, 2009; Doni and Ricciuti, 2013; Ambec and De Donder, 2020).
Closer to us, Eriksson (2004) who uses a product di¤erentiation setting to show that green consumerism
cannot replace environmental regulation.
In a di¤erent strand of literature, consumers internalize partially the environmental damages generated by the consumption of polluting goods (Cremer and Thisse, 1999; Bansal and Gangopadhyay,
2003; Amacher et al., 2004; Lombardini 2005). Fuelled by empirical analysis that shows that consumers
attribute a symbolic value to clean goods (He¤ner et al., 2007; Sexton and Sexton, 2014), Ben-Elhadj
and Tarola (2014) assume that consumers choose green products not only to satisfy material needs but
also to obtain a socially worthy position along a social ladder. The merit of these contributions is to
open the door to psychological and sociological considerations that are likely to a¤ect the preferences
5
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of environment-friendly consumers.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 characterizes the
equilibrium of any price subgame. In Section 4, we solve the quality game. Section 5 focusses on how
the supply of environmentalism a¤ect the environmental surplus and social welfare generated by the
market equilibrium and discusses the properties of the second best social optimum in which a planner
chooses qualities and compare these outcomes to the market solution. In Section 6, we discuss the
combination of environmentalism with various standard policy instruments. Section 7 concludes.

2

The model

We consider a market for a vertically di¤erentiated good produced by two …rms G and B that supply
each one product. A product embeds both environmental and hedonic attributes. The environmental
attribute of a product is determined by the social cost of the greenhouse gas emissions generated by
both its production and consumption. For simplicity, we assume that the two products share the same
hedonic characteristics. Note, however, that our results remain valid if the environmental and hedonic
attributes are aligned or if the former dominates the latter. Since the quality of the green product,
denoted by qG , is higher than the quality of the brown product, denoted by qB , we have qG > qB . This
quality ranking re‡ects consumers’awareness of the environmental consequences of their consumption,
which di¤ers from what we call below environmentalism.
Preferences. There is a unit mass of heterogeneous consumers. In line with the literature, we assume
that the product is indivisible (i.e., a durable) and that each consumer buys one unit of a single product
(perhaps because this product is a necessity good), so that the whole market is covered. Each product is
characterized by two attributes. The …rst one is intrinsic to the product and given by its environmental
quality discussed in the above paragraph. The second attribute is extrinsic to the product and pertains
to the reference group to which a consumer relates, or aspires to relate, herself through the product she
consumes.
The reference group is formed here by those consumers who buy the green product. Belonging to this
group confers a psychic bene…t to its members that translates into a higher utility. This psychic bene…t
G

> 0 which varies across consumers, is the concrete form taken by the impact environmentalism on

individual preferences. By contrast, very much like Groucho Marx who did not want to belong to a club
that will accept him as a member, a consumer who buys brown su¤ers a negative e¤ect – under the
form of shame or guiltiness – that reduces her welfare. This is because buying a polluting product is
perceived as a negative action that excludes her from the reference group. Consequently, the psychic
cost

B

< 0 the consumer bears makes her worse o¤. Like the psychic bene…t, it is individual-speci…c.

6
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Formally, consumers are endowed with pro-environmental preferences. We follow the literature and
assume that a ( 1 ;

2 )-consumer

is endowed with a linear indirect utility (Neven and Thisse, 1990;

Vandenbosch and Weinberg, 1995: Lauga and Ofek, 2011):

V ( 1;
where

=

1 qG

+
1 qB +

:

2

G

2

B

1;

pG ; if she consumes G
pB ; if she consumes B
otherwise

(1)

0 refers to the heterogeneity of consumers’willingness-to-pay for the environmental quality

1

qi , while

2)

8
<

2

0 measures the idiosyncratic evaluation of the psychic bene…t (resp., cost) that a consumer

enjoys (resp., bears) when she is (resp., is not) a member of the reference group. This modeling approach
may be viewed as a crude, but natural, way to capture the idea that the pursuit of socially positive
values a¤ects di¤erently the well-being of di¤erent groups’members. Since consumers are free to choose
which product to buy, the group they belong to is the outcome of individual utility maximization. Note
also that (1) implies that a consumer with a high (resp., low) psychic bene…t for being green also faces
a high (resp., low) psychic cost when she is brown, which seems reasonable.
Models of vertical di¤erentiation typically assume that consumers are heterogeneous in a single
attribute (Tirole, 1988; Belle‡amme and Peitz, 2015; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018). Since products
are here characterized by two attributes, it seems natural to consider a setting in which consumers are
heterogeneous along the two characteristics. However, the few attempts made to develop two-dimensional
models of product di¤erentiation show that working with those settings become quickly very cumbersome
from the analytical point of view. Since the focus of this paper is on the role of environmentalism, we
assume with Garella and Lambertini (2014) that consumers are homogeneous in their attitude toward
the environmental quality of products, that is, the distribution of
at

1

is atomic with a unit mass point

= 1. As a result, consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay for green than for brown. Using an

atomic distribution is, therefore, unlikely to a¤ect the nature of our …ndings since the green product is
dominant in the two attributes. Note also that the …rst attribute of a product, which is given by its
environmental quality, is a continuous variable.
In (1), the second attribute is given by a binary variable that refers to the group the consumer
belongs to:

G

=

> 0 and

B

=

where

measures what we call the environmental ideology. That

said, we may rewrite preferences (1) as follows:
V( )=

qG +
qB

pG ;
pB :

Thus, things work as if a -consumer were to pay the price pG
pB +

(2)
for the green product and

for the brown. These prices are consumer-speci…c but they also vary with the supply of

environmentalism. By contrast,

is common to all. Since a higher supply of environmentalism makes the

7
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greens better-o¤ and the browns worse-o¤, the environmental ideology

a¤ects consumers’willingness-

to-pay, hence …rms’behavior on the market. Clearly, a consumer having a high value for

is greener

than a consumer having a low value.
Two remarks are in order. First, by assuming linear utilities, (1) and (2) remain in the tradition of
standard models of product di¤erentiation. It might seem more reasonable to consider a setting in which
consumers’welfare varies with the size of the group she belongs to. It is worth stressing that the …ndings
obtained in the next sections hold true (up to some new numerical coe¢ cients) if the psychic bene…t of a
-consumer is given by nG and her psychic cost by nB where ni is the mass of consumers who purchase
product i. In this context, consumers, and not only …rms, are involved in a game-theoretic framework
in which they must choose which …rm to patronize. The elements of the resulting partition may then be
viewed as the equilibrium networks or groups of consumers generated by a pair of qualities and a price
system. Even in this case, our setting di¤ers from the few models of vertical product di¤erentiation with
consumption externalities, such as Brécard (2013), because environmentalism implies that the group a
consumer belongs to a¤ects her welfare in opposite ways. Moreover, we assume that being a member
of a group generates a (dis)satisfaction that is consumer-speci…c. Therefore, we may safely conclude
that our setting is not another model of product di¤erentiation with network externalities. Additional
evidence can be found in the dissimilarities between several of our results with those obtained in the
literature.
Second, in line with the literature we assume that the parameter

is uniformly distributed over

the interval [0; 1]. However, our analysis can readily be extended to any interval [a; b] with 0

a<b

by rescaling the corresponding attribute. Furthermore, in (2) the qualities qG and qB can be weighted
by a coe¢ cient
notation, we set

> 0 that re‡ects their relative value in consumer preferences. To ease the burden of
= 1. Hence, a lower

also means that the environmental qualities per se matter

more to consumers than the environmental ideology. Given these normalizations, a high or a low value
of

should not be interpreted in too a restrictive way.

Demands and costs. Substituting (2) into VG ( ) = VB ( ) and solving for

yields the consumer

indi¤erent between buying G or B at prices pG > 0 and pB > 0:
=

(pG

pB )

(qG
2

qB )

(3)

:

Like in standard models of vertical di¤erentiation, how consumers are allocated between green and
brown depends on the price gap pG

pB and the quality gap qG

qB : the larger the former (resp. the

latter), the smaller (resp., the larger) the green product’s market share. The impact of
consumer

on the marginal

is a priori ambiguous since it has the sign of the numerator of (3). More speci…cally, if the
8

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1318

10

Marini et al.: Is Environmentalism the Right Strategy to Decarbonize the Wo

price gap dominates the quality gap, more consumers buy green when environmentalism gets stronger,
that is,

has the expected impact on the allocation of consumers between products G and B. When

the latter dominates the former, fewer consumers buy green.
In (3), we implicitly assume that the marginal consumer

belongs to the open interval (0; 1).

However, it should be clear that the right-and-side of (3) may be smaller than 0 or larger than 1.
Consequently, the equilibrium value of
1

and DB =

that must be used to determine …rms’market demands DG =

are given by the following expression:
(pG ; pB ; qG ; qB ) = max 0; min

(pG

pB )

(qG
2

qB )

;1

:

(4)

Let us now come to …rms’ cost. A …rms’ choice of a better (environmental) quality gives rise to
speci…c expenditures, such as R&D and capital goods, which typically have the nature of endogenous
overhead expenditures. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that most of the burden of quality
improvement falls on …xed costs F (q) (Ronnen, 1991; Motta, 1993). Nevertheless, marginal costs c(q),
which are constant with respect to output, are likely to increase with quality because producing a better
environmental quality typically requires more expensive inputs (Lauga and Ofek, 2011).
Since a steady improvement of the environmental quality is likely to require more and more investment in R&D and capital, the function F is also strictly convex in q. In line with the literature, we
assume that …xed costs are quadratic in q, i.e., F (q) = q 2 =2. We also assume that the quality marginal
cost is proportional to the chosen quality, i.e., c(q) = cq where c is a positive constant. In what follows,
we assume that both …rms have access to the same technology described by the marginal cost cq and
the …xed cost q 2 =2, which both depend on the quality q. In our setting, developing new technologies
that allow producing greener products at lower costs does not generate additional pollutants because
the possible damages caused by such technologies are taken into account in the environmental qualities
supplied by …rms.
The pro…t function of …rm i = G; B is then as follows:
i (pG ; pB ; qG ; qB )

= (pi

cqi )Di (pG ; pB ; qG ; qB )

qi2
;
2

i = G; B:

Competition between …rms is modeled as a two-stage game. Let q be the highest environmental
quality that can produced under the current technology, while the minimal quality is normalized to
0. At the …rst stage, …rms choose the environmental quality of their product along the spectrum of
technologically feasible qualities given by the interval [0; q] where the lowest quality is normalized to 0.
At the second stage, …rms compete in prices with pG

cqG and pB

cqB . The …xed costs and are sunk

at the price competition stage of the game. The market outcome is given by a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. For this equilibrium to be consistent with the above demand functions, it must be that
9
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qG > qB . The market outcome is given by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, the game is
solved by backward induction.
Let us make a pause in order to discuss what makes vertical product di¤erentiation di¤erent from
horizontal product di¤erentiation. The distinctive feature of the former is the “…niteness property,”
which states that only a limited number of …rms can survive in equilibrium. More speci…cally, the
market equilibrium involves a maximal number of …rms whose value depends on the degree of consumer
heterogeneity even when …xed costs are arbitrarily small. Since q

c(q) stands for the social value

of quality q, this property holds if and only if consumers agree on the ranking of all products when
each quality q is priced at its marginal cost c(q). Otherwise, a …rm can always sell its output to the
consumers who rank its product …rst because these consumers are willing to pay a price that slightly
exceeds the product’s marginal cost (Shaked and Sutton, 1983; Anderson et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and
Tarola, 2018). In this case, there is horizontal di¤erentiation.
Under vertical di¤erentiation, two cases may arise according to the value of c. In the former case,
all consumers prefer green to brown when pi = cqi , that is,
qG +
must hold for all

cqG > qB

cqB

2 [0; 1]. The most binding condition arises at

= 0, which means (1 c)(qG qB ) > 0.

For this to hold, it must be that c < 1. In the latter, all consumers prefer brown to green, i.e.,
qB
must hold for all

cqB > qG +

2 [0; 1]. The most binding condition arises at

2 . Since this inequality must be satis…ed for all

cqG
= 1, which implies (c

1)(qG

qB ) >

> 0, it amounts to c > 1. In this case, all

consumers prefer B and G, which is the reverse of the ranking obtained when c < 1. Since our focus is
on consumers endowed with pro-environmental preferences when qG > qB , we assume c < 1. Note also
that this assumption implies that the social surplus qi

cqi associated with quality qi is strictly positive

for qi > 0.

3

How does price competition a¤ect the consumption of the
green and brown products?

In order to determine how environmentalism a¤ect …rms’behavior and the level of pollution generated
by the consumption of goods di¤erentiated by their environmental qualities, we need a benchmark case
that describes the market outcome when consumers’choices are una¤ected by social considerations, i.e.,
= 0.

10
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3.1

Price competition in the absence of environmentalism

By setting

= 0 in (2), we obtain the benchmark case in which consumers care only about their own

choices. We have a standard setting in which two …rms selling a vertically di¤erentiated product and
producing at di¤erent marginal costs compete in prices. Studying the case where

= 0 is worth doing

because it allows us to determine how the market outcome is a¤ected by environmentalism.
Since consumers are homogeneous when

= 0, …rms compete in prices under di¤erent marginal

costs. Consequently, they undercut each other until one …rm reaches its marginal cost. In the presence
of a price tie, it is natural to assume that the price tie is broken in favor of the …rm with the lower
marginal cost since this …rm is able to further lower its price. Since all consumers prefer to buy G when
both products are priced at their marginal costs, …rm G can undercut …rm B until its price is equal to
pG (qG ; qB ) = qG

(1

(5)

c)qB > cqG ;

while pG (qG ; qB ) = cqB , and thus the green …rm supplies the entire market. The above pair of prices is
a Nash equilibrium of the price subgame.
Thus, In the absence of environmentalism ( = 0), all consumers buy from the green …rm, which
sets a price above its marginal cost. This …rm sets a price such that consumers are indi¤erent between
the two products, whereas the other …rm prices at marginal cost. This shows the main implication of
using an atomic distribution for quality: there is no equilibrium in which both …rms share the market
and earn positive pro…ts. As shown below, this ceases to hold when

3.2

is positive.

Price competition in the presence of environmentalism

When

> 0, a -consumer considers the following “quality indices” before making her purchasing

decision:
QG ( )

qG +

> qG

QB ( )

qB

< qB :

Observe that qG and qB are …rm-speci…c, while QG ( ) and QB ( ) are consumer-speci…c. This difference is a distinctive feature of our model. In addition, raising

means that QG increases whereas

QB decreases, even when qG and qB do not change. So, everything else, a higher environmental concern
strengthens the market power of the green …rm relative to the brown …rm by magnifying the quality
di¤erence qG

qB .

Since the pro…t function

i

is concave in pi , applying the …rst-order condition yields the following

equilibrium prices when both …rms share the market (0 <
pG (qG ; qB ) =

1
(2cqG + cqB + (qG
3

qB ) + 4 ) ;

< 1):

pB (qG ; qB ) =

1
(cqG + 2cqB
3

(qG

qB ) + 2 ) :
(6)

11
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Whereas pG (qG ; qB ) > cqG always holds, pB (qG ; qB ) > cqB if and only if

> (1

c)(qG

qB )=2.

Otherwise, …rm G charges the limit price and …rm B remains out of business, a result that typically arises
in vertical di¤erentiation models when consumer heterogeneity is low (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979;
Wauthy, 1996). Assume now that

satis…es the above condition, so that …rms G and B share the market.

In this case, both prices increase with the intensity of environmental ideology ( ") because psychic costs
and bene…ts rise. Stated di¤erently, environmentalism relaxes competition at the price stage. However,

the green …rm’s price grows faster than the brown …rm’s with
renders the green product even more attractive as QG

because more environmental ideology

QB becomes wider. Furthermore, pG increases

while pB decreases with the quality gap qG qB . Indeed, when the quality gap widens, the environmental
ideology strengthens the green product’s attractiveness, which incentivizes …rm B to lower its price to
restore its market share. This di¤ers from what we observe in standard models of vertical di¤erentiation
where both prices increase with the quality gap.
Furthermore, the price di¤erential is given by
1
((2 + c)(qG qB ) + 2 ) > 0:
(7)
3
Hence, a wider quality gap leads to a wider price di¤erential because pG increases while pB decreases
pG (qG ; qB )

with qG

pB (qG ; qB ) =

qB . Plugging pG (qG ; qB ) and pB (qG ; qB ) into (4), we get the following expression for the

marginal consumer at the equilibrium prices:
(qG ; qB ) =
where k

(1

k 1=2 (qB
6

qG )

1
+ ;
3

(8)

c)2 > 0. Hence, a higher environmental concern allows the brown …rm to capture a

bigger market share because its rival builds on the resulting higher psychic costs and bene…ts to charge
a much higher price.

3.3

The impact of environmental ideology on market prices

However, the level of environmental ideology must exceed the cuto¤

B

to generate this positive e¤ect.

This may explain why the global ecological footprint is una¤ected by a mild environmental concern.
When

= 0, we have seen that …rm G serves the whole market. When

still have (qG ; qB ) = 0 until the threshold

G

k 1=2 (qG

= 0 are indi¤erent between the two products. When

becomes positive, we

qB ) > 0 is reached where the consumers at

rises above

G,

both the psychic bene…ts of the

greens and the psychic costs of the browns rise. As shown by (8), (qG ; qB ) becomes positive. Therefore,
product B is sold to the consumers belonging to [0; (qG ; qB )]. Why do some consumers now choose to
buy the brown product? As

increases, both prices increase but pG increases faster than pB . When

the price gap is wide enough, this induces the low -consumers to buy B. In other words, a su¢ ciently
12
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strong environmental ideology allows the brown product to enter the market. By implication, a more
environment-friendly population ends up with a worse ecological footprint, the reason being that this
social motivation exacerbates the perceived quality di¤erence QG

QB , which in turn leads …rm G,

1

hence …rm B, to charge higher prices.
Furthermore,

G

increases with qG

qB . Therefore, a shock that improves the environmental quality

of B makes it easier for this product to enter the market. Clearly, the entry of B raises the global level
of pollution.
The next proposition provides a summary.
Proposition 1. When the degree of environmental ideology is low, the brown …rm cannot enter the
market. However, a su¢ ciently high value of

>

G

leads to a higher level of pollution through the

entry of the brown …rm. Once this …rm is in business, increasing

raises the level of pollution because

fewer consumers buy green.
This counterintuitive result shows that a social attitude that seems bene…cial to the environment
may generate perverse e¤ects by raising disproportionately the market power of the green …rm. More
speci…cally, this …rm takes advantage of the growing psychic bene…ts associated with the consumption
of the green product to raise its price at a level su¢ ciently high for the brown …rm to enter the market
or for more consumers to buy brown, even though the psychic costs associated with this consumption
also increase.
The n-…rms case.

Before studying quality competition, it is worth stressing that Proposition 1 is

not an artefact of working with a duopoly. To illustrate, we consider n

2 …rms whose environmental

qualities are given by qk = kq for k = 1; :::; n and q > 0 (in the 2-…rm case considered above, we have
qG = q2 and qB = q1 ). For analytical simplicity, we also assume that c = 0. The following proposition
is then proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 1a. There exist n
if and only if

>

k

1 thresholds

for k = 1; :::; n

1

> ::: >

1. Furthermore, when

k

> ::: >

n 1

such that …rm k is active

increases, the active …rms charge higher

prices.
Thus, as the environmental ideology spreads, …rms enter sequentially from high to low environmental
qualities because the incumbents enjoy more market power.
It might be argued that these …ndings are caused by the assumption of …xed environmental qualities.
In other words, quality competition could lead to a better environmental outcome? To answer this
question, we must determine how …rms choose their qualities in a strategic context. Since solving the
1

Note also that this price escalation tends to reduce consumers’real income, which may incite them to buy cheap, but
dirty, goods on other markets.
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vertically di¤erentiated oligopoly problem for n qualities is notoriously hard, we return to the case of
two …rms.

4

The environmental qualities supplied by the market

We now turn our attention to the …rst stage of the game in which …rms choose their environmental
qualities qG and qB in the interval [0; q].

4.1

The case of a high supply of environmentalism

Duopoly models of vertical di¤erentiation are characterized by interior equilibria where the two …rms
share the market or by corner equilibria where the high-quality …rm secures the entire market (Anderson
et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018).
4.1.1

Interior equilibrium

A quality equilibrium (qG ; qB ) is said to be interior when 0 < (qG ; qB ) < 1, so that two …rms enter
the market. Assume that such an quality equilibrium exists. Plugging the prices (6) into …rms’pro…t
functions yields the payo¤s of the …rst-stage game:

4 + k 1=2 (qG
(q
;
q
)
=
G G B
18

qB )

2

1 2
q ;
2 G

B (qG ; qB )

=

2

k 1=2 (qG
18

qB )

2

1 2
q :
2 B

(9)

Note here a …rst di¤erence with standard models of vertical di¤erentiation where a wider quality
gap implies higher pro…ts for both …rms. While the green …rm’s pro…ts always rise as the quality gap
widens, this holds true for the brown …rm if and only if k 1=2 (qG

qB ) =2 remains smaller than . The

impact of environmental ideology on pro…ts is similar: the green …rm’s pro…ts always increase with
whereas the brown …rm’s …rst decrease and then decrease. This is because psychic bene…ts and costs
both rise but also diverge more and more.
Since the function
of

qi2

i

is quadratic in qi , then

i

is strictly concave in qi if and only if the coe¢ cient

in the function (9) is negative, that is
k
:
(10)
9
is continuous and strictly concave on the compact interval [0; q], which
>

In this case, the function

i

implies that the quality game has a Nash equilibrium.
The …rst-order conditions with respect to qualities yield the following best-reply functions:

14
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qG (qB ) = min max 0;

k 1=2 (4
9

k 1=2 qB )
k

;q ;

qB (qG ) = min max 0;

k 1=2 (2
9

k 1=2 qG )
k

;q :
(11a)

When (10) holds, qualities are strategic substitutes, that is, when a …rm increases (resp., decreases)
the environmental quality of its product, its rival …nds it pro…t-maximizing to decrease (resp., increase)
its own quality. This concurs with the wide-spread idea that quality di¤erentiation relaxes price competition.
The candidate equilibrium qualities are obtained by solving the system of linear equations (11a)
whose unique solution is:
2k 1=2 6
qG =
3 9

k
2k 1=2 3
> qB =
2k
3 9

k
:
2k

(12)

Note that the average quality (qG + qB )=2 = k 1=2 =3 is independent of .
For (12) to be an interior quality equilibrium, qG and qB must satisfy the following conditions: (i)
q > qG > qB > 0, (ii) (qG ; qB ) 2 (0; 1), and (iii)

G (qG ; qB )

>

B (qG ; qB )

> 0.

First, it is readily veri…ed that qG > qB if and only if
>

2k
9

(13)

holds, while qB > 0 if and only if2

k
:
(14)
3
Clearly, (14) is more stringent than (10) and (13). Unless explicitly mentioned, we assume that this
>

condition holds. Moreover, we have qG < q because qB > 0.
Second, the marginal consumer (8) at (12) is such that
(qG ; qB ) =
It is readily veri…ed that 0 <

3
9

k
:
2k

(15)

< 1 always holds under (14).

Third, substituting (12) in (6), we obtain the equilibrium markups and pro…ts:
pG (qG ; qB )

cqG =

2 (6
k)
;
9
2k

pB (qG ; qB )

cqB =

2 (3
k)
;
9
2k

(16)

and
2 (6
k)2 (9
k)
G (qG ; qB ) =
2
9
(9
2k)

2 (3
k)2 (9
k)
;
B (qG ; qB ) =
2
9
(9
2k)

(17)

2

Observe that qB > 0 also holds when both the numerator and denominator of qB are negative. This case is considered
in Section 6.
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which are all positive by implication of (14). Observe also that both
with

G (qG ; qB )

and

B (qG ; qB )

raise

, which con…rms what we said in the foregoing, namely, environmentalism endows …rms with

market power. Since

G (qG ; qB )

B (qG ; qB )

> 0, each …rm would like to be the quality leader at the

equilibrium like in standard models of vertical di¤erentiation.
Furthermore, since qualities are strategic substitutes, the quality space is endogenously bounded
above by
qG (0) =

4k 1=2
> 0:
9
k

We will see below that k 1=2 is another upper bound on qG . Therefore, we set
q = max qG (0) ; k 1=2 :
Note that q = qG (0) if and only if

(18)

> k=5.

To sum up, we have shown the following result: if

> k=3, there exists a unique (up to a permutation

of …rms’names) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and both …rms share the market.
4.1.2

Corner equilibrium

What happens to the market outcome when (14) does not hold? Plugging qB = 0 in (11a) yields the
corresponding equilibrium quality of the green product when
qG (0) =

= k=3:

4 k 1=2
:
9
k

(19)

while (qG (0); 0) = 0. In this case, the green …rm sets the highest price such that the consumers at
= 0 are indi¤erent between buying the green quality qG (0) or the brown quality qB = 0 at price
pB = cqB = 0. In other words, the green …rm sets a price pG such that
qG (0) +
holds for the consumers at

pG = 0

0;

= 0 who are indi¤erent between G and B. Therefore, …rm G chooses the

limit price pG (qG ) = qG (0), which agrees with (5), and its pro…ts are given by
G (qG

(0) ; 0) =

4 k(7
k)
:
2
(9
k)

Since (qG (0) ; 0) increases with , the green …rm accurately anticipates that

= 0 when

< k=3,

while it will charge its limit price pG = qG . As a result, this …rm’s pro…t function is no longer given by
(9), but by the following expression where we have set pG = qG :
G (qG ; 0)

= k 1=2 qG

2
qG
:
2

(20)
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It is then immediate that (20) is maximized at qG = k 1=2 while the corresponding pro…ts are equal to
G (k

1=2

; 0) = k=2 > 0.

It remains to check whether …rm G prefers k 1=2 or qG (0) when qB = 0. It is readily veri…ed that
1=2
; 0)
G (k

G (qG (0) ; 0) =

k)2
> 0;
(21)
k)2
< k=3. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of

k (5
2 (9

so that qG (0) is not …rm G’s best reply against qB = 0 for
the quality game is given by (k 1=2 ; 0) for

< k=3. That the limit price pG = qG is the green …rm’s Nash

strategy when consumers are not very heterogeneous is in accordance with the literature on vertical
di¤erentiation (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Anderson et al., 1992; Gabszewicz and Tarola, 2018).
The limit price is larger than the marginal cost cqG because c < 1, but lower than the monopoly price
because G is constrained in its price choice by potential competition with B. The market now has the
structure of a natural monopoly in the sense that it can sustain only one …rm.
The expression (21) has another consequence: (k 1=2 ; 0) is a Nash equilibrium over the interval (k=3; )
with

> k=3 (see Appendix B.1). Consequently, there exist two pure strategy equilibria given by the

interior equilibrium (qG ; qB ) and the corner equilibrium (k 1=2 ; 0) over this interval. So, we need a selection
device to pin down one equilibrium.
Consider the following 2
respectively, k

1=2

2 game where the players are …rms G and B whose strategy spaces are,

; qA and f0; qB g. The corresponding payo¤ matrix is as follows:
GnB
k 1=2
qG

0
; 0);
G (k
G (qG ; 0) ;
1=2

B (k

1=2

; 0)
B (qG ; 0)

G

qB
k ; qB ; B k 1=2 ; qB
G (qG ; qB ); B (qG ; qB )
1=2

This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria given by (k 1=2 ; 0) and (qA ; qB ). No equilibrium
Pareto-dominates the other because
G (k

1=2

; 0) >

G (qG ; qB );

B (qG ; qB )

>

B (k

1=2

; 0):

Standard re…nements must be ruled out because they do not select among strict Nash equilibria such
as ours. One noticeable exception is the concept of risk-dominance introduced by Harsanyi and Selten
(1988), which extends the concept of Pareto-dominance. The argument goes as follows. The corner
outcome (say) is a risk-dominant equilibrium if

G (k

>

1=2

; 0)

G

G (qG ; qB )

G

(qG ; 0)
k 1=2 ; qB

B (k

[

1=2

; 0)

B (qG ; qB )

B

k 1=2 ; qB
B

(22)

(qG ; 0)]

holds. When the opposite inequality holds, the risk-dominant equilibrium is the interior outcome. In
words,

G (k

1=2

; 0)

G

(qG ; 0) is the gain made by …rm G when …rm G predicts accurately that …rm B
17
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will play 0 and best responds to this prediction by playing k 1=2 , instead of predicting wrongly that …rm
B will play qB . The same holds mutatis mutandis for …rm B. By choosing a risk-dominant equilibrium,
…rms G and B maximize the product of their deviation losses.
The following lemma is proven in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 1. On the interval (k=3; ), the corner equilibrium (k 1=2 ; 0) risk-dominates the interior
equilibrium (qG ; qB ).

4.2

The case of a low supply of environmentalism

It remains to discuss the case where

< k=9. When this inequality holds, we know that

is strictly convex in qG (resp., qB ). Thus, regardless of the value of qB ,

G

G

(resp.,

B)

is maximized at qG = 0 or at

qG = q where (18) implies q = k 1=2 . The same holds for …rm B. In other words, we have a 2

2 game

where the two …rms share the same strategy set f0; qg.

Observe …rst that (q; q) cannot be an equilibrium because both …rms make negative pro…ts. Second,

plugging qG = q and qB = 0 in (8) implies that (q; 0) = 0. In this case, …rm G chooses the limit price
pG = q, so that its pro…ts are given by
G (q; 0)

1 2
q = k=2 > 0:
2

= k 1=2 q

Last, (0; 0) is not a Nash equilibrium because …rm G’s best reply against qB = 0 is k 1=2 . As a result,
(k 1=2 ; 0) is the only Nash equilibrium of the quality game for

< k=9.

The following proposition summarizes the above …ndings.
Proposition 2. (i) For 0 <

< k=3, (k 1=2 ; 0) is the only Nash equilibrium. (ii) For k=3 <

0:410k, (k 1=2 ; 0) is the Nash equilibrium selected by the risk-dominance criterion. (iii) For

<

'

> , the

two …rms share the market at the qualities (qG ; qB ) and prices (pG ; pB ).
This proposition con…rms the idea that motivates this paper, i.e., environmentalism a¤ects the
market outcome but in ways that are hard to predict. More speci…cally, the supply of environmentalism
has no impact on the equilibrium outcome and its environmental performance when it does not exceed
the threshold . Consequently, the environmental ideology must be strong enough to have an impact on
the greenness of the economy. Furthermore,the equilibrium strategy qG at the interior equilibrium is
such that
qG =

2k 1=2 6
3 9

k
< k 1=2 :
2k

As a result, in societies where the protection of the environment is not a signi…cant concern ( < ),
market competition leads the green …rm to invest more in environmental quality because it has less
market power.
18
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5

Environmentalism and the market

The general belief holds that a higher concern about the ecological implications of consumerism fosters
a better environment through more selective consumers’choices. This argument is too simplistic. First,
it disregards the fact that consumers’choices are also in‡uenced by the prices and qualities of the goods
made available on the market. For example, when the brown product is cheaper than the green one, the
consumers whose willingness-to-pay is low will purchase the brown one. More importantly, by changing
consumers’incentives, environmentalism leads …rms to revise their price and quality strategies in a way
that need not reduce the carbon footprint generated by the consumption of the goods. In other words,
environmentalism may generate e¤ects unexpected by activists who often overlook the way markets
work.

5.1

How the environmental ideology a¤ects …rms’qualities?

In what follows, we study the e¤ect of a change in , which captures the population’s environmental
ideology, on the market outcome.
(i) Assume …rst that
qualities with respect to

>

. Totally di¤erentiating the …rst-order conditions for the equilibrium

yields the following expressions:
dqG
@ 2 G (qG ; qB )
= sign
= sign(qB
d
@ @qG
dq
@ 2 B (qG ; qB )
sign B = sign
= sign(qG
d
@ @qB
sign

qG );
qB );

so that

dqB
dqG
<0
> 0:
d
d
In words, a hike in the degree of environmental ideology leads the brown …rm to produce a better

environmental quality whereas the green …rm chooses to raise its emission of pollutants. Hence, a more
environmental-friendly population does not leads both …rms to choose better environmental qualities.
On the contrary, the quality gap shrinks symmetrically about the average quality k 1=2 =3. These …ndings
are not straightforward because the literature suggests instead that …rms have a taste for product
di¤erentiation that often leads them to move far apart (Tirole, 1988). However, we want to stress
that …rms’ desire to di¤erentiate their products does not mean that they want to choose maximal
di¤erentiation. In the above, even though the quality gap shrinks, …rms G and B keep selling di¤erent
qualities.
Consider …rst the impact of a higher environmental ideology ( ") on the equilibrium prices when

qualities are given. As the psychic bene…ts and costs increase with , …rm G enjoys relatively more

market power than …rm B because the perceived quality gap QG QB widens with . Furthermore, since
19
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c < 1, (7) implies that a change in the quality gap qG

qB is associated with a less than proportional

change in the price gap. Moreover, (8) shows that more consumers buy green when the quality gap
shrinks ( #). Combining these various e¤ects allows the green …rm to save on its investment expendi-

tures by reducing its quality without reducing much its market share. Since the brown …rm loses some
market power relative to the green …rm, the former strives to regain consumers by improving its own
quality. Eventually, both the quality and price gaps end up being narrower after the rise in the supply
of environmentalism. Hence, more consumers buy brown. It should be clear that the environmental
consequences of these changes in …rms’strategies are not easy to predict.
A standard argument of product di¤erentiation theory would suggest that the impact of

on …rms’

pro…ts is negative because products are less di¤erentiated. Let us show that things are more involved
than that.
Using (17), It is straightforward to check that d B (qG ; qB )=d > 0 always holds. However, d G (qG ; qB )=d
p
is positive if and only if > ^ ( 17=9 + 1)k > because G (qG ; qB ) > k=2 at ^ . When 2 ( ; ^ ),

…rm G’s pro…ts decrease with . Indeed, the higher psychic bene…ts associated with the consumption
of the green variant do not endow …rm G with enough market power to compensate this …rm for the
narrower quality gap that favors …rm B.
In other words, environmentalism is bene…cial to both …rms when
activists do not probably suspect. This is so because, when

> ^ , an e¤ect that environmental

is su¢ ciently large, higher psychic bene…ts

and costs make consumers su¢ ciently heterogeneous to permit …rms to charge higher prices. However,
a higher

may be detrimental to the green …rm for intermediate value of

because the stronger

heterogeneity of consumers does not compensate this …rm for its shrinking market share.
(ii) We now come to the case where 0 <

< . Proposition 2 implies that qG = k 1=2 and qB = 0.

Therefore, the green quality does not depend on the environmentalism.
Thus, …rms operating in a more environmental-friendly society need not choose better environmental
qualities. More importantly, since k 1=2 > qG > qB , the market delivers the best ecological outcome when
environmentalism is weak.

5.2

Environmental surplus and social welfare

We now turn our attention to the impact of green consumerism on the environmental surplus and
social welfare generated by the market equilibrium described in Proposition 2. More speci…cally, does
a greener society incentivize …rms to choose qualities and prices such that consumers’choices lead to
a better environment and/or a higher social welfare? To assess the overall impact of a quality pair
(qG ; qB ), we use two di¤erent criteria, i.e., the environmental surplus and the social welfare.

20
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5.2.1

Environmental surplus

The environmental surplus (ES) measures the environmental impact of the consumption of the green
and brown variants at the market outcome. It is is de…ned as the sum of the market shares of the two
variants, weighted by the environmental quality of the corresponding product:
ES(qG ; qB )

EG(qG ; qB ) + EB(qG ; qB ) = [1

(qG ; qB )] qG + (qG ; qB ) qB :

Recall that we have normalized the best environmental quality to q and the worst to 0. As a result,
the environmental surplus is minimized when all consumers purchase the quality q = 0, whereas ES
reaches its highest value when all consumers buy the quality q. The value of ES always increases when
a growing number of consumers buy the green variant. By contrast, the opposite holds when more
consumers purchase the brown variant. This highlights the role of the marginal consumer in evaluating
the environmental surplus generated by a given quality pair (qG ; qB ). Furthermore, when …rms change
the environmental quality of their products, this has a direct e¤ect on the environmental surplus, but
also an indirect impact through the new value of the marginal consumer
qG and qB according to (15). Consequently, the impact of

since this one varies with

on ES must account for several distinct

e¤ects.3
Assume a environmentalist society that evaluates the market outcome through the sole criterion ES.
We only discuss the case where both …rms share the market because the quality k 1=2 in independent of
for
with

< . It then follows from (15) that more consumers buy brown when

rises. Since qG decreases

, EG thus decreases. As for the brown variant, we have seen that its quality rises. Since the

market share of …rm B increases, the net impact on EB is positive. In sum, the impact of

on EG and

EB are opposite. Comparing the variations of EG and EB shows that jdEG=d j > jdEB=d j holds,

which means that ES decreases when the environmental ideology is heightened (see Appendix C.1).

Since the green …rm enjoys more signi…cant psychic bene…ts, it is able to supply a lower quality
sold at a higher price. These two e¤ects incentivize more consumers to shift to brown. In addition,
the brown …rm supplies a better quality which should attract even more consumers away from …rm G
despite the higher psychic costs. The combination of all these e¤ects allows …rm B to raise its price,
but not as much as its rival. The net negative e¤ect on EG dominates the net positive e¤ect on EB,
so that the environmental surplus associated with the market outcome decreases with

.

Disregarding the costs generated by the supply of environmental qualities seems too extreme for
the following two reasons. First, besides consumption, production often generates pollution. Second,
increasing the environmental surplus at a monetary cost that exceeds the opportunity cost of money is
obviously not socially desirable. This is why we …nd it more reasonable to consider the net environmental
3

Note that maximizing the environmental surplus is equivalent to minimizing the environmental damage ED
which is often used in the literature.

q ES,
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surplus de…ned as follows:
N ES(qG ; qB ) = ES(qG ; qB )

C(qG ; qB );

where the total cost

1 2
1
) + cqB + qG
+ qB2 ;
2
2
is the social cost of producing the qualities qG and qB when the mass of green consumers is 1
C(qG ; qB ) = cqG (1

while

is the mass of brown consumers.
Recall that the average quality (qG + qB )=2 is independent of . When qG decreases by the amount
2
> 0 while qB increases by the same amount, the investment cost qG
=2 + qB2 =2 decreases with . Since

the environmental surplus and the investment costs vary in the same direction, while (1
move in opposite directions, the impact of

)cqG and qB

on N ES is a priori ambiguous. Nevertheless, Appendix

C.1 shows that the net environmental surplus decreases with the supply of environmentalism, i.e., the
drop in ES dominates the drop in costs.4
Summing up the above results, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume

> ^ . Then, a higher supply of environmentalism makes …rms better-o¤

but worsens the (net) environmental surplus at the market outcome.
The result, which clashes with mainstream pro-environmental claims, tells us something important:
a greener society does not trigger a better ecological footprint because …rms adjust their qualities in a
way that may incite more consumers to purchase the brown variant, while the green …rms reduces its
environmental quality. This highlights once more the need to study how the market selects prices and
qualities before evaluating the social desirability of environmentalism.
5.2.2

Social welfare

Since all consumers buy a single unit of the di¤erentiated product, there is no deadweight loss. Therefore,
prices have the nature of transfers from consumers to …rms and need not be taken into account. The
social welfare must account for the psychic bene…ts and costs. As indirect utilities are linear, the social
bene…t associated with the consumption of the green variant may be obtained by summing the gross
indirect utilities across greens:
SG(qG ; qB )

Z

1

(qG +

)d = (1

)qG +

2

(1

2

);

4

In the foregoing, we assume that ES and C are directly comparable because consumers know the “true” social value
of the environmental qualities. However, in a population formed by individuals having di¤erent attitudes toward the
environment, …nding a consensus on the value of environment might be problematic. One way out is consider ES C
as the environmental surplus where the parameter is treated as the “shadow price” of environmental qualities. When
these ones are endowed with a higher weight than costs ( > 1), ES still decreases with while the drop in ES still
dominates the drop in C. Hence, ES C decreases with even when takes on higher values.
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while the social bene…t generated across browns is similarly de…ned by
Z
2
(qB
)d = qB
SB(qG ; qB )
:
2
0
The social welfare (SW ) is then given by
SW (qG ; qB )

SG + SB

(23)

C(qG ; qB ):

Hence, the social welfare encompasses the (net) environmental surplus.
Observe that SW = N ES + ( ) where the net psychic bene…ts is given by
( )
As shown in Appendix C.2, the function

=2

2

is convex in

:
and the derivative of

at

= 2k=3 is

positive. Therefore, in response to a higher supply of environmentalism, …rms adjust their qualities to
raise the net psychic bene…ts at an increasing rate. To put if di¤erently, rather than reducing the ecological
footprint, environmentalism incentivizes …rms to choose qualities that make consumers psychologically
better-o¤.
Since N ES decreases while

increases with , the impact of environmentalism on social welfare is

a priori undetermined. We then proceed as follows.
Di¤erentiating (23) twice shows that the social welfare function is convex in

(see Appendix C.3).

Since SW has a positive intercept for all k 2 [0; 1] while the derivative of SW at k=3 is negative for
all k 2 [0; 1], the function SW reaches its minimum at ~ > k=3. In other words, SW decreases over
(k=3; ~ ) and increases for > ~ .
Hence, we have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 4. As the level of environmentalism steadily rises, the social welfare at the market
outcome …rst decreases and, then, increases.
In other words, environmentalism delivers its expected e¤ects when it reaches a su¢ ciently high
level. However, the so-obtained welfare gains are not generated by a less polluted environment since the
(net) environmental surplus goes down. Rather, these welfare gains stem from the additional bene…ts
consumers enjoy by purchasing green. Once more, this result shows that greener consumerism is not the
solution to our environmental problems. Quite unexpectedly, it may even worsen the outgoing situation
because a higher supply of environmentalism a¤ects …rms’ behavior in ways that are not necessarily
easy to understand when strategic interactions between …rms are ignored.

6

Environmental policies

In a way, the above …ndings are disappointing. This leads us to consider the following policy instruments: (i) the development of green technologies and (ii) a minimum quality standard. We discuss their
23
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e¢ ciency per se. Furthermore, when combined with these instruments, environmentalism might deliver
its expected payo¤s. Unless explicitly mentioned, we consider only the case of an interior equilibrium.

6.1

Green technologies

It is widely accepted among policy-makers that the use of more environmental-friendly technologies is
one of the main tools that should permit the development of a green society. Reformulating this idea
in our setting amounts to assuming that …rms have access to a technology that allows them to produce
qG and qB at lower costs. We are agnostic about the reasons that explain the emergence of this new
technology. In this section, our aim is instead to investigate the market and environmental e¤ects of
such a technology. More speci…cally, we consider a cost function, which we view as a reduced form for
an abatement or replacement technology designed through innovations or governments subsidizes.
So far, we have assumed that production costs are given by cq + q 2 =2. We start by assuming that
…rms’…xed costs decrease. Formally, the …xed production costs are now de…ned as follows:
F (q) =
where

q2
;
2

(24)

> 0 measures the technological greenness of the production technique: the higher , the lower

the cost of designing the environmental quality q. Since we have normalized
sections, we study how increasing

= 1 in the previous

above 1 a¤ects the market outcome.

Fixed costs. Assume for the moment that both …rms adopt the new technology described by (24).
Following Section 4, it can be shown that, for

>

= 0:410 k=3, the equilibrium qualities are

given by
qG =
which are both positive since

2 k 1=2 6
3 9
>

2 k 1=2 3
k
> qB =
2 k
3 9

k
;
2 k

(25)

. When this inequality does not hold, we have a corner solution

which involves only the green …rm.
It is readily veri…ed that the green quality increase with the degree of technological greenness. As
for the brown one, the argument goes as follows. We have:
2
2k 2 2 + 9 (3
2k )
dqB
:
= k 1=2
2
d
3
(9
2k )
As the numerator of this expression is a quadratic and convex function of
the brown quality also increases with

when

which is positive at

= 0,

> 0:526 k. Thus, both environmental qualities increase

with technological greenness when the supply of environmentalism is su¢ ciently high. In this case, the
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green quality rises faster than the brown one. This is because the strict convexity of the …xed cost
function implies that a higher technological greenness has a bigger impact on …rm G than on …rm B.
Furthermore, the average quality

increases with

qG + qB
k 1=2
=
;
2
3
while the quality gap, hence the price di¤erential, widens.

Moreover, it holds that
3
9

(qG ; qB ) =
because

k
> 0;
2 k

> k=3. Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to

shows that the market share of the

green variant grows with .
Since the environmental surplus is given by
2 1=2 2k 2 2 18k + 45
ES = k
3
(9
2k )2
The derivative of ES with respect to

:

is equal to

dES
= (15
d
which is positive for all

2

2k )

2k 2

2

12k + 27
(9
2k )3

2

;

and .

Moreover, the e¤ect on net environmental surplus is also positive. Indeed, we have:
N ES =
so that

2 k (3
9

dN ES
2
= k (3
d
9

k) (2k 2
(9

k) (15

2k )

2

+ 9 (5
2k )2

2k 2

2k ))

;

+ 27 2 12k
(9
2k )3

2

> 0.

For the above …ndings to be meaningful, it must that the two …rms adopt the new technology. But
do they want to do so? Plugging (25) in (9) yields the following equilibrium pro…ts:
G (qG ; qB ) =

2 (9
9

k 2 ) (6
k )2
;
(9
2k )2

B (qG ; qB ) =

Di¤erentiating these expressions with respect to
contrast, …rm B’s pro…ts decrease because

2 (9
9

k 2 ) (3
k )2
:
(9
2k )2

(26)

shows that …rm G’s pro…ts increase with . By

> k=3. As a result, it is not clear that …rm B wants to

adopt the new technology.
Consider a game prior to the quality game, where each …rm chooses either to adopt or not to adopt
the -technology. Lemma 2, proven in Appendix D, shows that both …rms choose the -technology.
25
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Lemma 2. In the 2

2 game where …rms chooses between the old and new technologies, adopting

the new technology is a dominant strategy for each …rm.
Like in Section 4, when

, the market outcome is given by the corner equilibrium where …rm

<

G’s strategy is given by qG = k 1=2 , which increases with , while …rm B’s strategy is still qB = 0. Here
too, technological greenness leads to a better environmental outcome.
We may thus conclude that

and

a¤ect the market outcome in opposite ways: whereas green con-

sumerism has a negative direct impact on environmental qualities and surplus, technological greenness
delivers positive e¤ects.
Observe that
@ 2 ES
=
@ @

36

k

9 +k
< 0:
(9
2k )4

Hence, environmentalism weakens the positive e¤ects of green technologies.
Marginal quality cost. We now investigate to the impact of a lower marginal quality cost. Since k
decreases with c, a lower marginal quality cost amounts to a higher k.
Assume …rst that

> . Di¤erentiating (12) with respect to k yields:

dqG
1 54 2 15k + 2k 2
;
= 1=2
dk
3k
(9
2k)2

dqB
1 (3
2k) (9
k)
:
= 1=2
2
dk
3k
(9
2k)

The sign of dqG =dk is given by the sign of the numerator, which is a convex parabola of k. This
parabola is positive at k = 0 and its minimum is reached at k = 15=4 . Plugging this value in the
numerator shows that this one is always positive. Therefore, the green quality increases with k. As for
the brown quality, it is immediate that dqB =dk is positive since

> k=9. In other words, the brown

quality also increases with k. Consequently, the average quality rises when the marginal quality cost
decreases.
Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to k shows that more consumers buy the brown quality when k
increases ( "). Nevertheless, it is easy to show that the impact of k on the environmental surplus is
positive. Furthermore, the net environmental surplus also increases with k.
Clearly, when

< , it is immediate that the equilibrium quality k 1=2 increases with k.

Summarizing yields the following proposition.
Proposition 5. For all levels of environmental ideology, a greener technology leads to a better
environmental outcome.
Hence, unlike environmentalism, a higher technological greenness always leads the market to provide
better environmental solutions.
26
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6.2

Minimum quality standard

Assume that

> 6k=9, so that the quality equilibrium is interior and given by (12) at the unregulated

market outcome. The minimum quality standard (MQS) Q must be such that Q > qB , for otherwise
the MQS would not bind. Since pro…t functions are strictly concave, there exists a quality equilibrium
(qG ; qB ) of the game where the strategy space of the brown …rm is given by [Q; q]. If qB > Q, qB
maximizes

B (qG

; qB ) over [Q; q]. Since

qB also maximizes

B (qG

B (qG

; qB ) is strictly concave over [0; q], qB > Q implies that

; qB ) over [0; q]. In this case, there would exist two interior quality equilibria,

(qG ; qB ) and (qG ; qB ), which contradicts Proposition 2. Therefore, in equilibrium, it is pro…t-maximizing
for the brown …rm to supply the quality Q. It then follows from (11a) that the green …rm chooses the
quality
qG (Q) =

k 1=2 (4
9

k 1=2 Q)
:
k

(27)

Hence, (qG (Q); Q) is the only candidate Nash equilibrium of the quality game where the strategy
space of the brown …rm is given by [Q; q]. However, for (qG (Q); Q) to be a Nash equilibrium, the following
conditions must be satis…ed: (i) qG (Q) > Q, (ii)

B (qG (Q); Q)

> 0, and (iii) 0 < (qG (Q); Q) < 1.

First, qG (Q) > Q holds if and only if Q < 4k 1=2 =9 < q. In this case, the quality gap qG (Q)

Q

shrinks as Q rises. It then follows from (6) that the green …rm sets a lower price whereas the brown
…rm is able to charge a higher price in the ensuing price subgame.
Since qG (Q) decreases with Q and Q > qB , we have qG (Q) < qG . Plugging qG (Q) and Q in (8) yields
the marginal consumer
(qG (Q); Q) =

16
2

2k + 3Qk 1=2
;
9
k

(28)

which increases with Q. Indeed, as Q rises, the quality of the green variant decreases, which makes
B more attractive to a wider range of consumers. By contrast, raising Q renders the green variant
relatively more attractive because its price decreases, so that more consumers buy green.
Second, di¤erentiating twice the pro…t function

B (qG (Q); Q)

with respect to Q shows that the

equilibrium pro…ts of the brown …rm are strictly concave in Q. Applying the …rst-order condition to
B

indicates that the maximizer Q of

solution Q0 . Since

B (0)

B

> 0, the function

is positive while the equation
B

B

= 0 has a unique positive

increases over (Q; Q) and decreases toward 0 over (Q; Q0 ).

Hence, the MQS Q must be lower than the two upper bounds 4k 1=2 =9 and Q0 . It can be shown that
the binding condition is given by Qmax

4k 1=2 =9 < Q0 . Substituting 4k 1=2 =9 in (28) shows that

0 < (qG (Q); Q) < 1.
We now study the impact of the MQS Q on the environmental surplus ES(qG (Q); Q). As in Section
4, we consider separately EG and EB. Di¤erentiating EG(qG (Q); Q) with respect to Q shows that the
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…rst-order condition has a single positive solution given by
Q0 =

4
;
k 1=2

which is larger than Qmax . Inspecting (27) and (28) shows that EG is strictly convex in Q. As a result,
EG decreases on (qB ; Qmax ). Furthermore, since

(qG (Q); Q) increases with Q, EB = Q (qG (Q); Q)

increases on (qB ; Qmax ).
We now come to the total impact of the MQS on the environmental surplus:
ES(qG (Q); Q) =

1 27 k 1=2 Q2 + (2k 2 + 54
2
(9

2

48 k)Q + 48
k)

2 1=2

k

2

;

which is quadratic and convex in Q. Furthermore, solving the …rst-order condition yields the unique
minimizer of ES:
Q=
which is positive at

27

2

+ 24k
27 k 1=2

k2

;

= k=3 and smaller than Qmax . Since
Q > qB ,

< 2k=3;

we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If k=3 <

< 2k=3, then the environmental surplus …rst decreases with the MQS

over (qB ; Q); and then increases over (Q; Qmax ). If

> 2k=3, the environmental surplus increases with

the MQS over (qB ; Qmax ).
Hence, in a duopoly, implementing a MQS is a more e¤ective strategy to reduce the volume of
emissions than environmentalism.
Note that the average quality (Q + qG (Q))=2 increases with Q and with , while the quality gap
shrinks with Q and .
Furthermore, the cross-derivative of ES is given by
@ 2 ES
=
@Q@

3k 1=2

Indeed, the numerator is negative at
Q = 4k

1=2

81Q

54k 1=2 + 9Qk
(9
k)3

2k 3=2

> 0:

= k=3, which is the minimum value of

, and negative at

=9, which is the maximum value of Q. Since it is increasing in Q and decreasing in , the

numerator is always negative. That is, the MQS and environmentalism are complements: environmentalism reinforces the positive e¤ect of the MQS on the environmental surplus associated with the market
outcome.
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7

Concluding remarks

Green consumerism is often presented as one of the main backbones of new environmental policies.
However, very little is known about its impact on …rms’ decisions. This paper aimed to reduce such
a lacunae. To this end, we have developed a simple and intuitive model that takes into account the
psychic costs and bene…ts associated with the consumption of goods that generate di¤erent amounts of
emissions. Using this setting has allowed us to show that the environmental ideology is largely ine¤ective
in curbing the damages generated by consumption in a market economy. Our …ndings suggest instead the
need for policy initiatives that di¤er from those aimed at promoting environmentalism. In particular, we
…nd that the two widespread instruments discussed in this paper do a much better job as they all reduces
the ecological footprint of consumption. Interestingly, environmentalism may now have di¤erent e¤ects
because it either strengthens or weakens the positive environmental impact of the policy instruments
considered.
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Appendix A
There are n

2 …rms while …xed production costs prevent n from becoming arbitrarily large. We assume

that …rms’ qualities are given by qk = kq for k = 1; :::; n and q > 0. In other words, environmental
qualities are ranked by increasing order (q1 < q2 < ::: < qn ) and the di¤erence between any two
neighboring qualities is the same and equal to q. Hence, the top environmental quality is qn = nq while
the bottom one is q. For simplicity, we also assume that c = 0.
A consumer of type

who buys the kth quality has an indirect utility given by
V k ( ) = qk

where

(n

(n

k)

for k = 1; :::; n

pk ;

k) stands for the psychological cost the consumer bears for not consuming the best

environmental quality qn , while pk is the price of quality qk . In this case, …rm k competes directly with
…rm k

1 and …rm k + 1, while …rm 1 (n) compete with …rm 2 (n

1) only. Hence, the consumer

k

indi¤erent between buying qualities qk+1 or qk is given by the solution to the equation:
qk+1

pk+1

that is,
k

=

(n

pk+1

pk

(k + 1)) = qk
q

pk

(n

for k = 1; :::; n

;

k);

(A.1)

1:

Assuming that types are uniformly distributed over [0; 1] with a unit density, …rm k’s demand is
given by
Dk

k

k 1

=

pk+1

2pk + pk

1

for k = 2; :::; n

;

1:

As for …rms 1 and n, their demands are, respectively, given by
D1 =

1

=

p2

p1

In the case of a duopoly (n = 2),
from the denominator of (A.1) where
bene…t and the psychic cost is 2

q

1

;

Dn = 1

n 1

=1

pn

pn

1

q

:

is identical to (3) where G = 2, B = 1 and q = qG

qB , apart

is replaced by 2 because the di¤erence between the psychic

whereas the di¤erence in psychic costs between qk+1 and qk is

.

Hence, the duopoly studied in Section 3 is a special case of our n-…rm setting. In what follows, we show
that the main properties of the price equilibrium obtained in Proposition 1 hold true for n

2 …rms.

Since qualities are given, we may disregard the …xed production costs in the price game.
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Pro…t functions are such that

where

k

1

=

k

= pk (

n

= pn (1

1

= p1
k

p2

p1

k 1)
n 1)

q

= pk

;
pk+1

2pk + pk
pn

= pn 1

pn

1

1

;
q

k = 2; :::; n

1

;

is continuous and quasi-concave in pk for k = 1; :::; n.

The 3-…rm case. Assume n = 3. If the price equilibrium is interior, the …rst-order conditions are as
follows:

p2
4p2

p1
2p3

2p1 = q;

(A.2)

p3 = 0;

(A.3)

p2 = q + ;

(A.4)

whose solution is

1
1
q;
12
2
which all increases with . Note that
p1 =

p2 =

D1 (p1 ; p2 ) =

6

;

1
(
12

which increases with . Moreover,
D3 (p2 ; p3 ) =

1
7
p3 = q +
;
2
12

(A.5)

18q) ;

q
+7
2

decreases with . Hence, the spreading of environmental ideology widens the market share of the bottom
quality and narrows down that of the top quality. In other words, when the three …rms operate, raising
leads to a market outcome that generates a higher level of pollution.
Since p1 < p2 < p3 , the equilibrium is interior if and only if p1 > 0, that is,
1

>

1

6q, where

is the unique solution to p1 ( ) = 0. In this case, it follows from (A.2) that …rm 2 charges the limit

price p2 = plim = q while …rm 3’s best reply implies that p3 = q + =2. Note also that (A.1) implies
1 (p1 ; p2 )

= 0 at these two prices.

Assume now that

crosses from

1

above, so that p3 also decreases. Below some threshold, p3

becomes small enough for …rm 2 to …nd it pro…table to set a price smaller than q. In this case, the
equilibrium prices of …rms 2 and 3, denoted p2 and p3 , are given by the solution to the system of
…rst-order conditions for these two …rms:
33
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p3

2p2 = q;

2p3

p2 = q + :

Solving yields
q

q+2
;
(A.6)
3
3
= 4q be the solution to the equation p2 ( ) = q. Clearly,

p2 =
which both decrease with
lim

4q <

When <

1,

. Let

lim

<

lim ,

lim

<

<

1.

…rms 2 and 3 charge the prices (A.6) that both decrease with . Since
; p3 ) =

p3

p2

q

=1

q

;

= q. In this case, we have p2 = 0 and p3 = plim

; p3 ) = 0 when

Hence, when

p3 =

and thus …rms 2 and 3 choose p2 = q and p3 = q + =2 for

2 (p2
2 (p2

;

crosses

2

q. Set

2

q<

lim

<

1.

from above, …rms 1 and 2 are out of business while …rm 3 supplies the whole

market at the price p3 = q.
In sum, we have: assume that
market when
2

<

<

3.

=

3

decreases from a value larger than

3.

First, …rm 1 exits the

while …rm 2 charges the limit price plim = q. Firms 2 and 3 remain in business for

Then, …rm 2 exits the market when

=

2

while …rm 3 remains in business charges the

limit price plim = q: Finally, …rm 1 remains in business for all
< q, only the high-quality …rm is in business; (ii) when
market; and (iii) when

0. In other words, we have: (i) when
< q < 6q, both …rms 2 and 3 are on the

> 6q, the 3 …rms supply the market. To put it di¤erently, a steadily growing

environmental ideology allows …rms with a decreasing environmental quality to enter sequentially the
market.
Putting all the above results together, we have shown that an economy characterized by a rising
environmental ideology generates a market outcome whose environmental standard goes down.
The n-…rm case. Di¤erentiating

k

with respect to pk yields the following second-order di¤erence

equations for an interior equilibrium:
p2
4pk

pk

1

2pn

2p1 = q
pk+1 = 0;
pn

1

k = 2; ::; n

1

(A.7)

= q+

The …rst and last equations are the same as (A.2) and (A.4) while (A.3) is a straightforward extension
of (A.3).
The characteristic equation associated with (A.7) is
Abk+1 + 4Abk

Abk

1

= 0;
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After simpli…cation, we have the following quadratic equation:
b2 + 4b
whose solutions are given by
b1 = 2 +

p

1=0

3 > 1 > b2 = 2

p

3 > 0:

Consequently, the solution to (A.7) is
pk = A1 bk1 + A2 bk2

(A.8)

where A1 and A2 are two unknown constants.
To …nd A1 and A2 , we proceed as follows. Note, …rst, that the equilibrium condition for …rm 1 is
p2 = q + 2p1 :
Applying (A.7) to …rm 1 yields:
4p1

p0

p2 = 0;

where p0 is the price set by a hypothetical …rm selling a variant of quality 0. It then follows from the
above two equations that
4p1

p0

q

2p1 = 0

whose solution in p0 is given by
p0 = 2p1

q:

Using (A.8), we obtain
p0 = A1 b01 + A2 b02 = A1 + A2 = 2p1

q = 2A1 b1 + 2A2 b2

q;

which implies
q + A1 (1 2b1 )
:
2b2 1
Equation (A.4) may be rewritten as follows:

(A.9)

A2 =

A1 bn1

1

+ A2 bn2

1

= 2A1 bn1 + 2A2 bn2 = q + :

Plugging (A.9), this expression becomes:
A1 bn1

1

+

(q + A1 (1 2b1 )) bn2
2b2 1

1

2A1 bn1

2

(q + A1 (1
2b2

2b1 )) bn2
+q+
1

=0

whose solution in A1 is equal to
A1 =

(2b1

+q
1) bn1 1

bn2

1

>0
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because 2b1

1 > 0. By implication of (A.9),
A2 =

(2b2

+ q(1 bn1 1 )
1) bn1 1 bn2

1

;

the sign of which depends on .
If the equilibrium is interior, the equilibrium prices are then given by
#
"
+ q 1 bn2 1 k
1
+ q(bn1 1 1) k
pk ( ; n) = n 1
b1 +
b2
2b1 1
1 2b2
b1
bn2 1

for k = 1; :::; n:

(A.10)

Note that (A.10) is equal to (A.5) (resp., (A.6)) when n = 3 and k = 1 (resp., n = 2 and k = 1; 2).
The equilibrium prices increase with

or q because a higher supply of environmentalism or a wider

quality gap endows …rms more market power. Since b1 > b2 , we have pk+1 > pk for k = 1; :::; n
Furthermore, pk increases faster than pk
As a result, when

1

with , so that

1 (p1 ; p2 )

and

n 1 (pn 1 ; pn )

1.

increases with .

rises, more consumers buy the bottom environmental quality while fewer consumers

buy the top quality.
The equilibrium with n …rms is interior if p1 ( ) > 0. For this to hold,

must be larger that the

solution to the equation p1 ( ) = 0, which is given by
q

1

By contrast, when

<

Assume now that k
1; :::; k

1,

b1

1
bn
1
2
2b1 1
b1
2b1 1

1
bn
1
1
1 2b2
:
b2
1 2b2

+ b2
+

p1 ( ) = 0 and …rm 1 is out of business.

1 > 0 …rms are out of business. Since pk > pk

1

> ::: > p1 , these …rms are

1, which means the …rst active …rm is …rm k. Let k
k) be the solution to
1 (n
#
"
+ q 1 bn2 k 1
+ q(bn1 k 1 1)
1
p1 ( ; n k) = n k 1
b1 +
b2 = 0;
2b1 1
1 2b2
b1
bn2 k 1

that is,
k

=

1 (n

k) = q

b1

k 1
bn
1
2
2b1 1
b1
2b1 1

k 1
bn
1
1
1 2b2
:
b2
1 2b2

+ b2
+

Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to n yields
d k
(2b1
=q
dn
because b1 > b2 . Thus, the value of

1)bn1

k 1

b2 ln b1 + (1
b1 b2

that solves p1 ( ; n

2b2 )b1 bn2

k 1

ln b2

>0

k) = 0 decreases as the number of active …rms

decreases. Therefore, we may rank the thresholds associated with the exit of …rms n
follows:

1

>

2

1 (n

1) > ::: >

n 1

1 (2).

Firm n

1; n

2; :::; 2 as

k remains active provided that

>

k.
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When

crosses

k,

…rm n

k is out of business at price pn

steadily increases from 0 …rms i = n
crosses

n i+1

1; n

k+1

= 0. To put the other way round, as

2; :::; 1 enter the market sequentially each time that

from below.

For the proof to be complete, it remains to show that

k

> 0 for k = 1; :::; n

1. First,

k

decreases

with k. Indeed, we have
d k
(1
=q
dk

2b1 )b1 k+n 1 b2 ln b1 + (2b2
b1 b2

because b2 < 1. Therefore,
that

k

=

1 (n

k

1)b1 b2 k+n

1

ln b2

<0

takes on its minimum value at k = 1. Since

for k < n
1 (2)

environmental quality …rm is active. When

is small enough ( <

becomes larger than

1,

1 ),

only the best

then …rm 2 enters the market

with a lower environmental quality, which leads to a worse ecological footprint. As
3; :::,

= q > 0, it must be

k) is positive.

We may summarize our main results as follows. When

2;

1

keeps rising above

more and more …rms that produce lower and lower environmental qualities get into business.

This gradually downgrades the environmental performance of the market outcome because a growing
number of consumers buy the worst environmental qualities. Note also that a wider quality gap (q ")
raise the value of the thresholds

k

and thus slows down the entry of lower environmental qualities.

This completes the proof of Proposition 1a, that is, a stronger environmental ideology leads to a
worse ecological footprint through the gradual entry of …rms selling more polluting products.

Appendix B
1. (k 1=2 ; 0) is a Nash equilibrium over (k=3; ) The argument involves two steps.
> k=3? By construction, k 1=2 is the best

Step 1. What is …rm G’s best reply against qB = 0 when
reply when

= 0. When 0 <

< 1, it follows from (9) that …rm G’s pro…ts are given by
G (qG ; 0) =

(4 + k 1=2 qG )2
18

1 2
q :
2 G

Di¤erentiating with respect to qG yields the solution
qG =
Since the second derivative of

G (qG ; 0)

4k 1=2
= qG (0):
9
k

is always negative,

Hence, qG is the best reply against qB = 0 for 0 <
(qG ; 0) =

G (qG ; 0)

is concave and maximized at qG .

< 1 because

k 4
1
3
+ =
6 9
k 3
9

k
k
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is positive for

> k=3. Evaluating

G (qG ; 0)

at qG yields

G (qG ; 0) =

8
9

2

k

> 0:

Since the other candidate best reply is qG = k 1=2 with (k 1=2 ; 0), it remains to compare
and

G (k

1=2

G (qG ; 0)

; 0). Observe that
k
2

8
9

2

1 16 2 + 9k
k2
=
k
2
2(9
k)

is a concave parabola in , which is negative at

= 0. Therefore, the numerator

16

2

+ 9k

k2 = 0

of the above expression has two positive roots given by
p
p
k
9
17
k
k
17 + 9
4k
<
k ' 0:152k <
and
<
k ' 0:410k <
9
32
3
3
32
9
Only the larger root is relevant because the smaller one is smaller than k=3. Setting
p
17 + 9
' 0:410k < 4k=9;
k
32
we have

k
2

In other words, when

8
9

2

k

> 0 , k=3 <

> , we have k=2 >

G (qG ; 0)

< :

over (k=3; ), which means that qG = k 1=2 is

…rm G’s best reply against qB =0 over (k=3; ).
Step 2. What is …rm B’s best reply against qG = k 1=2 when

> k=3? It follows from (11a) that

…rm B’s best reply is
qB (k 1=2 ) = k 1=2

2
9

k
> 0:
k

At the strategy pair (k 1=2 ; qB (k 1=2 )), we have
(k 1=2 ; qB (k 1=2 )) =
if and only if

32
29

k
>0
k

> k=2. Otherwise, qB = 0 is B’s best reply against k 1=2 . Therefore, qB = 0 is B’s best

reply against k 1=2 over (k=9; k=5).
Putting Steps 1 and 2 together implies that (k 1=2 ; 0) is a Nash equilibrium over (k=3; ).
2. Proof of Lemma 1. Set b

=k and assume b > 1=3. It is readily veri…ed that (k 1=2 ; qB ) > 0

i¤ b > 4=9 while (qG ; 0) > 0 always holds. Furthermore, we also have (qG ; 0) < 1 and
because b > 1=3. Since

(k 1=2 ; qB ) < 1

< 4k=9, the only relevant case is (k 1=2 ; qB ) = 0:
38
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The corner equilibrium risk-dominates the interior equilibrium if and if:
G (k

>

1=2

; 0)

G

G (qG ; qB )

G

(qG ; 0)

B (k

k 1=2 ; qB

[

1=2

; 0)

k 1=2 ; qB

B

B (qG ; qB )

B

(qG ; 0)] :

The payo¤ matrix is as follows:
k
2
1=2
; 0) = 0
B (k
G (k

1=2

; 0) =

G (qG ; qB )

=

B (qG ; qB )

=

2k 2916b4 972b3 +36b2 +3b+k4
81
b(9 2k)2
(3b 1)2
1=2
; qB = 2k
B k
9 (9b 2)2
1=2
; qB = k2
G k
2
2
2k (3b 1) (9b 1)
2
B (qG ; 0) = 81
b(9b 2)
G

2
2k (6b 1) (9b 1)
9
(9b 2)2
2
2k (3b 1) (9b 1)
9
(9b 2)2

(qG ; 0) =

The corner equilibrium risk-dominates the interior equilibrium if and if:
G (k

>

1=2

; 0)

G

G (qG ; qB )

G

(qG ; 0)

B (k

k 1=2 ; qB

[

1=2

; 0)

k 1=2 ; qB

B

B (qG ; qB )

B

(B.1)

(qG ; 0)] :

Using the above payo¤s yields:

G (k

; 0)

G

(qG ; 0)

2 2916b4
81

k
2

=

1=2

B (k

1=2

; 0)

B

k 1=2 ; qB

972b3 + 36b2 + 3b + 1
b (9b 2)2

1)2
2)2

2 (3b
0+ k
9 (9b

k 2 ( 11 664b4 + 10 449b3 3060b2 + 312b
=
729
b (9b 2)4

4) (3b

1)2

!

:

Similarly,
G (qG ; qB )

= k2

G

k 1=2 ; qB

2 (6b 1)2 (9b 1)
9
(9b 2)2

k (3b
=
729

1)2 (9b

1
2

[
!

B (qG ; qB )

B

(qG ; 0)]

2 (3b 1)2 (9b 1)
9
(9b 2)2

1) (1296b3 1305b2 + 408b
b (9b 2)4

40)

2 (3 1)2 (9b 1)2
81
b (9b 2)2

!

:

The inequality (B.1) holds if and only if
k ( 11 664b4 + 10 449b3 3060b2 + 312b
729
b (9b 2)4
k (3b
>
729

1)2 (9b

1)2

4) (3b

1) (1296b3 1305b2 + 408b
b (9b 2)4

40)

;
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which is equivalent to
1 (3b
729

1)2 ( 2592b3 + 2034b2
b (9b 2)3

441b + 22)

> 0:

The above expression is positive because its numerator
2592b3 + 2034b2

441b + 22;

is positive over the interval (1=3; ). This completes the proof of Lemma 1.

Appendix C
In this appendix, we provide the main expressions used to prove the results of Section 5.
1. (Net) Environmental surplus. Consider an interior equilibrium so that

> 6k=9. The value of

the environmental surplus at the equilibrium outcome is given by the following expression:
ES(qG ; qB ) =
Di¤erentiating w.r.t.

2k 1=2 45 2 37k + 8k 2
:
3
(9
4k)2

yields:
dES
=
d

2k 3=2 27
3 (9

4k
< 0:
4k)3

As for the net surplus, it is given by
N ES(qG ; qB ) =
Di¤erentiating N ES w.r.t.

2k 90 2 75 k + 16k 2
:
9
(9
4k)2

yields:
dN ES
=
d

2k 2 (15
3 (9

4k) k 2
< 0:
4k)3

Likewise, di¤erentiating N ES w.r.t. k yields:
dN ES
4
= (3
dk
9
which is positive for all

k)

120k + 135 2 + 32k 2
;
(9
4k)3

> 0.
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2. Net psychic bene…ts. (i) Interior equilibrium:
( )=

2

> k=3.
3
9

2

k
2k

2

;

so that
d2
d
Hence,

2

=

4k) k 2
> 0:
2k)4

3 (9
(9

is strictly convex.

Since the derivative

evaluated at

2k 3 144k 2 + 31k 2
(9
2k)3
is increasing in for > 0.

d
d

= 0 is positive,

3 216
=
2

(ii) Corner solution: 2k=9 <

3

k=3. Since (qG (0); 0) = 0, we have
( )=

2

;

which also increases with .
3. Social welfare at the market outcome. Assume
Z

SG(qG ; qB )

> . Social bene…t across greens is equal to

1

(qG +

)d = (1

)qG +

while social bene…t across browns is similarly de…ned by
Z
SB(qG ; qB )
(qB
)d = qB
0

2

2

(1

2

2

);

:

Evaluating the total social welfare at the market equilibrium yields:
SW (qG ; qB )

(1

)qG k 1=2 +

1 567
=
18

3

(1

2

3

378
(9

) + qB k 1=2

2
+ 144 2 k 126 k 2 + 16k 3
;
(9
2k)2

2

2

1
(qG )2
2

1
(qB )2
2

so that
dSW (qG ; qB )
1 567
=
d
2

2

k + 62 k 2
2k)3

4k 3

> 0;

and
d2 SW (qG ; qB )
2 (99
=
2
d
(9

4k) k 2
> 0:
2k)4
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Appendix D
We know from (17) and (26) that
G (qG ; qB ) =

2 (9
k) (6
k)2
;
9
(9
2k)2

2 (9
k) (3
k)2
9
(9
2k)2

B (qG ; qB ) =

k 2 ) (6
k )2
k 2 ) (3
k )2
2 (9
;
B (qG ; qB ) =
9
(9
2k )2
(9
2k )2
Assume that …rm G adopts the new technology whereas …rm B does not. Then, pro…ts are de…ned
2 (9
G (qG ; qB ) =
9

by
4 + k 1=2 (qG
G (qG ; qB ) =
18

qB )

2

1 2
q ;
2 G

B (qG ; qB )

=

2

k 1=2 (qG
18

qB )

2

1 2
q : (D.1)
2 B

Applying the FOCs yields the following equilibrium qualities:
qG =

2 k 1=2
3 9

6

k
;
k ( + 1)

qB =

2k 1=2
3
k
:
3 9
k ( + 1)

Plugging qG and qB into (D.1), we obtain
G (qG ; qB ) =

2 (6
9 (9

k)2 (9
k )
;
k ( + 1))2

B (qG ; qB ) =

Firm B prefers to select the new technology (

2 (9
9 (9

k) (3
k )2
:
k ( + 1))2

(D.2)

> 1) rather than sticking to the old technology

( = 1) as

B (qG ; qB )

B (qG ; qB ) =

(9

k ) (9
(9

k ( + 1))2
2k )2 (9

(9
k) (9
k ( + 1))2

2k )2

(D.3)

> 0:

Indeed, the denominator of this expression is always positive and strictly decreasing in , while
the numerator is equal to 0 for
B (qG ; qB )

= 0 at

= 1 and increasing in

for

> 1. This implies that

B (qG ; qB )

= 0 and increases in . Consequently, (D.3) is positive and increasing for all

> 1.

In other words, when …rm G adopts the new technology, …rm B …nds it pro…table to do the same.
Similarly, the equilibrium pro…ts when …rm B adopts the new technology and …rm G does not are
given by
k) (6
k )2
2 (3
k)2 (9
k )
(q
;
q
)
=
;
:
(D.4)
B G B
2
9 (9
k ( + 1))
k ( + 1))2
Firm G’s pro…t di¤erence between adopting and not adopting the new technology when …rm B
G (qG ; qB ) =

2 (9
9 (9

adopts the new technology is given by
G (qG ; qB )

G (qG ; qB )

=

(9

k ) (9
(9

k ( + 1))2
2k )2 (9

(9
k) (9
k ( + 1))2

2k )2

> 0:

(D.5)
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Repeating the above argument shows that

G (qG ; qB )

G (qG ; qB )

> 0 for all

> 1. In other words,

it is not optimal for …rm G to stick to the old technology when …rm B adopts this technology.
Consider now the 2

2 game where the two …rms possess two strategies, either to adopt (A) or not

to adopt (N A).
GnB
A
NA

A
G (qG ; qB );
G (qG ; qB );

B (qG ; qB )
B (qG ; qB )

NA
G (qG ; qB ); B (qG ; qB )
G (qG ; qB ); B (qG ; qB )

Using (D.2) and (17) imply

B (qG ; qB )

>
,
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2

2 (3
9 (9

, k(

2

2 (9
k) (9
k) (3
k)
k )
>
2
2
9
k ( + 1))
(9
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2
9 (9
k ( + 1)) + k (
1)
> 0:
1)
2
2
(2k 9 ) (k 9 + k )

Similarly, (D.4) and (17) imply
G (qG ; qB )

>

(D.7)
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2

2 (6
9 (9
2
k (k
,
9
,

2

k) (9
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2 (9
k) (6
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>
2
2
9
k ( + 1))
(9
2k)
9 (9
k ( + 1)) + k 2 (
1)
6 )2 (
1)
> 0:
2
2
(9
2k) (9
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It then follows from (D.3), (D.5), (D.6), and (D.7) that A is a dominant strategy for each player.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
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